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2026-02-25.log
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<gnucode>sneek later tell youpi When I said "ftpfs runs a root by default"...I should have said that /ftp:/ runs as root by default. I am not aware of any guide that says to "sudo settrans node /hurd/ftpfs". I did read in one of the irc logs that it would be a cool idea if there was a "trusted" uses group, such that, if my user joshua would run translaters set by these trusted users. As far as I know, root is the only "trusted" user. <gnucode>am I correct in thinking that the Hurd currently runs translaters set up by other users by default ? Or is that incorrect? <gnucode>I wonder if the work my spritely institute...goblins for instance...could help the running translators by untrusted users issues. <gnucode>I believe that goblins is trying to figure how to run untrusted code safely. <gnucode>I also feel like following unprotected users translators is somewhat unlikely. The average computer user controls all of his files. I don't share my home directory with other users for example. <gnucode>I suppose that this thing becomes problematic when users share the same nfs. <gnucode>That actually is kind of a cool idea. Maybe we should have a Hurd playground somewhere, where hurd users can request access to a shared Hurd server. <youpi>the hurd runs translators set up by other users, yes, but under their uid <sneek>youpi, gnucode says: When I said "ftpfs runs a root by default"...I should have said that /ftp:/ runs as root by default. I am not aware of any guide that says to "sudo settrans node /hurd/ftpfs". I did read in one of the irc logs that it would be a cool idea if there was a "trusted" uses group, such that, if my user joshua would run translaters set by these trusted users. As far as I know, root is the only "trusted" user. <youpi>and glibc does protect itself from rogue translators, which wouldn't answer the interrupt RPC for instance <youpi>root is not particularly trusted <youpi>in terms of translator owner <youpi>it's the /dev and /servers directories which are trusteed <youpi>and there you can have various uids for the translators <gnucode>youpi: so what happens if a rogue user karen sets up a malicious translator on the world writable /tmp that secretly redirects to /home ? If I run " sudo rm -rf /tmp" do I inadvertently delete /home ? <youpi>yes, that's why tools have no_symlink options by default <youpi>and they'll avoid following translators the same way <gnucode>oh, the Hurd's current policy is O_NOTRANS , which means do not follow translators from untrusted users by default ? <youpi>it's not a hurd policy, it's programs themselves which does this <youpi>rm doesn't want to follow symlinks blindly on linux either <gnucode>hmmm, I've never seen /hurd/filter ... <jab`>it's so nice to be able to tweak the hurd wiki again. <jab`>I am connected! woo hoo! I needed to create the /var/run/mysql directory and run # chown _mysql:_mysql on it. <jab`>I don't know why that wasn't done by default, but whatever. <jab`>I also don't know if mariadb is running in a chroot or not. <jab`> I think I might just leave my local mariadb database passwordless. It's not like I really need a password on my local machine...as far as I can tell.